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5
The antagonism remains. It is postulated. And from it flow 
many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the 
Kremlin’s conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the 
lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness, 
and the basic unfriendliness of purpose. […] When there is 
something the Russians want from us, one or the other of 
these features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into 
the background; and when that happens there will always 
be Americans who will leap forward with gleeful announce-
ments that ‘the Russians have changed’.
George Kennan, ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’ (1947)1
IntroductIon
It is an undeniable fact that the West’s policy towards post-
Soviet Russia has failed, if we consider it from the perspective 
that, since the beginning of the 1990s, its goal has been the in-
tegration of Russia with the West – understood as Moscow’s ac-
ceptance of the fundamental political and economic standards of 
the West, and the foundation of a mutually advantageous coopera-
tion in the security sphere (if we exclude those circles in the West 
whose sole purpose was to maximise their profits from cooperat-
ing with Russia, even when doing so required them to participate 
in pathological business practices). The current state of bilateral 
relations permits the assertion that the results of this policy have 
proved to be quite the reverse of those intended. To a great ex-
tent, this is the result of either a mistaken recognition of Russian 
intentions by Western policy makers (perceiving Russia through 
the prism of the West’s political culture), or of drawing false con-
clusions from correctly formulated diagnoses (the hope that Rus-
sia’s pathological political-economic system could be gradually re-
formed thanks to a pragmatic, depoliticised economic cooperation 
with the West).
1 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1947-07-01/
sources-soviet-conduct; https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Sources_of_
Soviet_Conduct
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The current state of affairs results both from the logic of the de-
velopment of the international situation after the Cold War, and 
from the Euro-Atlantic community’s vested interests. It seems, 
however, that the West also made a serious mistake in under-
estimating the importance of the entire complex of domestic 
political determinants for Russia’s behaviour on the interna-
tional stage. Due to the nature of the Russian political system, 
Moscow’s interest lies not in cooperation with the West, accord-
ing to the logic of mutual benefits, but rather in confrontation and 
conflict. Such ‘zero-sum game’ thinking is not the result of the 
Kremlin’s current, short-term needs and interests, but is rather 
the foundation of the Russian elite’s view of the world as a whole. 
This will last for as long as the current political model prevails in 
Russia, so for the foreseeable future we may rule out any real nor-
malisation of mutual relations (understood in the West as demili-
tarisation and the economisation of relations, together with prag-
matic cooperation in the management of selected global issues).
The aim of this text is to offer a description and analysis of 
these domestic determinants and of their relationship to the 
Kremlin’s foreign policy. These include both the objective deter-
minants resulting from the non-consensual, non-public nature of 
policy in the authoritarian system, and above all, the entire com-
plex of subjective determinants. These are associated with the 
particular mentality of Putin’s elite and the complexes and pho-
bias held in common by both the ruling class and Russian society. 
They assume the principled rejection of the Western liberal dem-
ocratic paradigm and its implementation in international rela-
tions. They also explain why Moscow has not made authoritarian 
China its main adversary, even though objectively Beijing’s rising 
international power poses a real threat.
The starting point of the text (part I) presents the charac-
teristics of Russian authoritarianism in its version under 
Vladimir Putin. It is conditional upon the past status of Russia 
as a superpower and empire, and upon the particular vision of 
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the international order resulting from this, which by its nature 
stands in opposition to the liberal vision. This in turn was accom-
panied by the experience of the disintegration of the USSR’s su-
perpower statehood as a result of losing the Cold War to the West, 
and of the dysfunction of both state and government in the 1990s. 
This also, next to the non-consensual political culture and the 
centralisation of decision-making processes typical of authoritar-
ian systems, is why Putin’s regime is characterised by the percep-
tion of foreign policy as first and foremost a tool of domestic politi-
cal legitimacy, and at the same time, as an area which offers not 
so much opportunities as threats. Relevant in this context are the 
attempts to bring undemocratic practices specific to Russia into 
the realm of international relations. Moreover, these confronta-
tional trends are reinforced by the structural crisis of the Russian 
economic model; this leads to a need to legitimise power by the 
use of non-traditional criteria drawing upon the logic of the ‘state 
of emergency’.
The second part of this work will be dedicated to a reconstruc-
tion and analysis of the mentality of the ruling elite in Rus-
sia, which is largely determined by the worldview of those of its 
members whose backgrounds lie in the Soviet security apparatus. 
This mentality is not a simple continuation of the Soviet mental-
ity; it was formed under the influence of the personal and genera-
tional experiences of the ‘wild capitalism’ of the 1990s. This allows 
us to analyse how the Russian elite thinks and exercises power 
through the prism of the rules prevailing in the criminal world. 
These two types of experience have led to the establishment in 
Russia of a Chekist-kleptocratic feudalist model – a system based 
on the elite’s paranoid anxiety of losing power, and on suspicion 
of the outside world. In this system, the aim of foreign policy, on 
the one hand, is to eliminate any external impulses that may af-
fect the development of the socio-political situation in Russia; and 
on the other, to maximise the particular financial benefits to the 
elite, who act as a parasite on the body of the state.
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The third part is an attempt to understand the source of the 
social mandate for the Kremlin’s confrontational, anti-West-
ern policy. This policy does not in fact exist in a vacuum, but en-
joys continuing support from a substantial part of Russian socie-
ty, thanks largely to the skills with which official propaganda has 
reactivated the public’s deeply ingrained mental matrices. These 
extend not only back to the Soviet era, but further to the earlier 
history of Russian autocracy; the public’s experiences connected 
with the first decade of the existence of the Russian Federation are 
also of great importance. This legacy assumes the persistence of 
an ‘authoritarian personality’, of an identification with a culture 
of violence and the virtualisation of politics, and also strengthens 
the ‘imperial syndrome’ present in the social mentality.
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I. the nature of PutIn’s authorItarIan 
system as a context for russIan 
foreIgn PolIcy
The environment in which Russian thought on foreign policy 
has been formed is the authoritarian system of government, 
which derives from the model of centralised authority that has 
been deeply rooted in Russian history. No genuine implementa-
tion of liberal democracy has ever succeeded in breaking through 
this model during the centuries of the construction of Russian 
statehood. This system is characterised by the fundamentally un-
democratic relationship between the rulers and society, as well as 
by the specific relationships within the ruling elite. Both of these 
features directly affect how the Kremlin formulates the ideologi-
cal and operational dimensions of Russian foreign policy.
1. The ‘classic’ characteristics of authoritarianism 
present in the Russian model
The most important element of this model is the vertical, hie-
rarchical structure of the management of the state. The result 
of concentrating state power in the hands of the leader and his 
immediate surroundings is a highly personalised system of de-
cision-making in both domestic and foreign policy (moreover, it 
is important that the decision-making circle closest to the Presi-
dent is for the most part made up of people whose roots are in the 
special services2). The decision-making processes are not under 
the supervision of parliament or the judiciary (due to the lack of 
a genuine tripartite division of power), nor of the general public. 
The underdevelopment of civil society structures and the repres-
sion applied to critics of the authorities, as well as the Kremlin’s 
de facto informational monopoly and marginalisation of the free 
media, allows the Russian government to manipulate the moods 
2 For more about the origins of Russia's decision-makers, see Chapter II of 
this study.
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of society quite freely. The vast majority of the political elite and 
the bureaucracy also lack any influence in shaping the decisions.
Foreign policy in Russia, then, is a non-public domain. This 
causes the policy to become hermetic in nature, and allows a nar-
row elite to impose an arbitrary definition of the national inter-
est. The goals of foreign policy are perceived through a prism of 
the vested (political and financial) interests of the ruling group, at 
the expense of the socio-economic interests of the general public. 
The key beneficiaries of the system are the persons who hold the 
highest positions of state (particularly the President, the Prime 
Minister, the heads of both chambers of parliament, and mem-
bers of the government), senior representatives of the regional 
authorities, and the oligarchs who are close to them (especially 
those who have personal ties to Putin).3
The non-public nature of the decision-making process allows the 
ruling class to quickly take and implement even the most contro-
versial decisions, which remarkably extends the scope of the au-
thorities’ room for manoeuvre, as well as their ability to surprise 
their rivals on the international stage. The most important threat 
resulting from this is the lack of any ‘brakes’ on the decision-mak-
ers in the form of restrictions on the selection of instruments of 
foreign policy, including the use of force.
3 The closest oligarchs to Putin include Igor Sechin, Yuriy Kovalchuk, Gen-
nady Timchenko and the brothers Arkady and Boris Rotenberg; these have 
all enriched themselves from public procurements. The selfish definition of 
the ‘national interest’ as the financial benefit of the representatives of the 
elite is exemplified by the introduction of an embargo on food imports from 
the West in 2014 (the lack of competition and the government subsidies for 
the domestic agriculture sector makes money for the family of the agricul-
ture minister Aleksandr Tkachov, among others), as well as the protection of 
Putin’s oligarchs (at the expense of the state budget) from the negative effects 
of the Western sanctions imposed in response to Russian aggression against 
Ukraine (including the so-called Timchenko Act of April 2017, allowing ex-
emptions from the payment of taxes in the Russian Federation for persons 
covered by international sanctions).
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One of the key differentiators of Russian foreign policy is the gov-
ernment’s desire to project elements of the Russian authori-
tarian model onto the country’s international surroundings. 
Attempts to move this uncontrolled model of government to the 
outside have resulted in the absolutisation of the category of sov-
ereignty. In the era of globalisation and international integration, 
Russia sees global order as a kind of an idealised ‘Westphalia’ 
system,4 in which the government has the exclusive right to con-
trol the internal affairs of the state (although Moscow does not 
apply this rule to other, especially smaller countries).
The Russian elite’s attitude towards international law derives 
from its attitude to the domestic legal sphere. In Russia itself, 
the highest executive power is limited only by its own will, so in 
international relations Moscow seeks to unilaterally establish the 
primacy of its own national law over international agreements, 
which involves the arbitrary and selective treatment of the latter. 
This leads to the increasing neglect – in the name of making Rus-
sia ‘sovereign’ – of the standards and guidelines of international 
organisations which Russia belongs to; and the international com-
mitments it has undertaken must give way before the sovereign de-
cisions of the authorities and the provisions of national law.5 This is 
an attempt to overcome the situation in which the Kremlin encoun-
ters external limits to its powers which it had long ago disposed of 
in its domestic policy. In the interests of its authoritarian regime, 
Moscow seeks above all a kind of ‘disarmament’, that is, the erosion 
of those political organisations and institutions whose ideological 
4 R. Allison, Russia and the post-2014 international legal order: revisionism 
and Realpolitik, International Affairs 93:3 (2017).
5 One sign in this context was the amendment to the Act on the Russian Federa-
tion's Constitutional Court in December 2015, in which the Court acquired 
the right to determine that the enforcement of judgements by international 
courts was not possible if they violated the principle of the primacy of the 
provisions of the Russian Constitution. This option was first used in April 
2016, when the Court refused to comply with the judgement of the European 
Court of Human Rights (which is a violation of the commitments Russia made 
in connection with its membership of the Council of Europe).
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foundations are human rights in the liberal understanding of the 
term. Moscow wishes to influence and manipulate them in its own 
political interests, to impose its own rules of the game;6 the empow-
erment of the individual and society as political actors is in conflict 
with the vital interests of the Russian ruling elite.
Another characteristic of the Kremlin’s foreign policy is the per-
ception of the domestic and foreign policies of other coun-
tries through the prism of Russian domestic political reality. 
Foreign societies are not seen as full participants in internation-
al relations, and in the view of the Russian government, ‘public 
opinion’ is only a product of the propaganda campaigns controlled 
by the authorities of other countries. In the Kremlin’s logic, any 
voices critical to Moscow or pressure coming from outside the 
structures of executive power of other states are perceived as be-
ing controlled by foreign governments, as a manifestation of the 
implicit agenda of their foreign policy, or as planned manipula-
tions. The activities of foreign non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) are seen in the same light. According to Moscow, these are 
‘branch offices’ of foreign governments and the espionage struc-
tures subordinate to them, and are merely tools for their ‘hostile’ 
policies – in the same way that the Kremlin-controlled Russian 
GONGOs7 are ‘branch offices’ of the government, performing the 
tasks abroad which have been entrusted to them by the Presi-
dent’s Administration or the special services. The policy makers 
in the Kremlin perceive foreign NGOs as the avant-garde of opera-
tions aimed at overthrowing ‘sovereign’ regimes similar to that 
of Russia. Russia recognises as ‘independent’ (from the local gov-
ernments) almost exclusively radical, anti-system, anti-liberal 
6 Россия против международного права: не подорвать, а манипулировать, 
https://republic.ru/posts/78655. The Russian doctrine was vividly described 
in May 2017 by the President of the Russian Constitutional Court, Valeriy 
Zorkin: «The defence of human rights should not pose a threat to state sov-
ereignty, and nor should it undermine the morals and religious identity of 
society»; www.newsru.com/russia/19may2017/zorkin.html
7 Pseudo-NGOs, de facto created or controlled by the government (government-
organised non-governmental organisations).
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groups from outside the Western mainstream, who thus become 
the natural environments for implementing the Kremlin’s opera-
tions of informational and espionage work. Moscow tries to make 
a ‘fifth column’ out of these groups, with the intent of dismantling 
Western liberal democracy from the inside, just as how (in the 
Kremlin’s view) the ‘fifth column’ in Russia is formed by the pro-
democratic, anti-Kremlin non-government and opposition organ-
isations which the regime is fighting against.
2. The historical and cultural peculiarities of Russian 
authoritarianism
The phenomena sketched above cannot per se be employed as 
a comprehensive explanation of the specific political culture 
of Russia8 as manifested in the international arena in both the 
sphere of diplomacy and in its practical political, economic and 
military activities. We must therefore look into the deeper, his-
torical-cultural fundament of Putin’s model of government 
which distinguishes Russia from other authoritarian states. This 
consists of a centuries-old imperial and superpower heritage 
which has resulted in a certain vision of the international 
order, as well as a legacy of recent history in its domestic po-
litical dimension which has formed the Kremlin’s philosophy 
of power. This legacy has been created by twentieth-century to-
talitarianism, the trauma of the dissolution of the empire, and the 
attempts to overcome the imperial-superpower heritage by Gor-
bachev’s perestroika and Yeltsin’s pseudo-democratic transforma-
tion. All of this lies at the root of the behaviours included in the 
8 According to the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, political 
culture is a set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and mean-
ing to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and 
rules that govern behaviour in the political system. Political culture is thus 
a manifestation of the psychological, subjective dimension of politics, and is 
a product of both the history of the political system, as well as the experience 
of its participants.
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paradigm of the psychology of Russian policy, which goes far be-
yond the logic of the purely authoritarian.
The Kremlin’s attitude to Russia’s historical heritage, as reflect-
ed in its perception of the substance of foreign policy, is focused 
around reflections on the role of international interactions in the 
acquisition, maintenance and loss of power. This leads the Russian 
elite to the conviction that strengthens the traditional authoritar-
ian logic: foreign policy must serve the objectives of domestic 
policy in almost every dimension (on a scale much greater than 
in democratic countries, where the rotation of governing groups 
is a regular part of the political process). These objectives include 
the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime and the reproduction 
of the current model of government, which is equivalent to secur-
ing the interests of the ruling group.
An important factor in the Kremlin’s anti-Western policy is and 
still remains the unconquerable psychological complex re-
sulting from the collapse of the empire and the degradation 
of Soviet power, and the imperative of rebuilding the state’s 
position as a superpower on the world stage. This is intended to 
serve, by means of effective influence on the global order, both the 
defence of the regime’s interests on the domestic stage, and the 
implementation of the objectives of its foreign policy, which are 
often fundamentally contrary to the interests of its Western part-
ners. Russia wants to obtain consent to dominate the post-Soviet 
area, rebuild Europe’s security architecture in accordance with 
its own interests, and maximise the economic and political bene-
fits of cooperation with the West without making any concessions 
on its part.
The ‘imperial-superpower’ complex strengthens the authoritar-
ian tendency to absolutise the nation’s sovereignty in external re-
lations. The Kremlin’s criterion for superpower status is mili-
tary power (in the case of Russia, mainly its nuclear potential), 
geopolitical influence and geostrategic territorial potential, 
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which are intended to ensure ‘full sovereignty’ for the state. 
In this understanding, the criteria which are important in a glo-
balised world, drawing upon the sphere of cooperation – economic 
power or ‘soft power’, the ability of the state to attract allies and 
gain influence thanks to the attractiveness of their own culture, 
politics or ideology – are relegated to the background. This is the 
result of Russia’s deepening backwardness compared to the West, 
and its decreasing attractiveness for its neighbours.
The Russian version of superpower status, therefore, is first 
and foremost the ability to resist the rest of the world, which 
accentuates its potential for destruction and destabilisation, as 
well as the desire to ensure its own security without considering 
the security of others. This also has implications for its political 
culture; Russia’s specific negotiation culture, based on the idea 
of ‘rising from its knees’ refers to the ‘culture’ of an army, which 
does not negotiate, but sets conditions from a position of strength. 
Bringing the country’s nuclear capability to the foreground as 
a key determinant of superpower status, which has the char-
acter of a final solution, means a willingness to raise the stakes 
in international negotiations, to escalate tension, and to employ 
blackmail. The consequence of this is a confrontational, con-
tentious vision of international order, typical of the military 
dimension, which was exercised to the highest extent in the age 
of Moscow’s zenith as a superpower, when the Soviet Union en-
joyed the status of a global power and was one of the two poles 
of global governance. Even today, this position is still a reference 
point for Russia’s ambitions and national interests.
Alongside its superpower status, the prism through which Russia 
sees its international environment is also drawn from historical 
experience (both that of imperial Russia and the Soviet Union) 
– the category of imperiality. Empire, as a form of organising 
a state, is based on a hierarchy of power in its domestic dimension 
and on expansionism in its external dimension – extending its 
influence and authority beyond its own borders, and subjugating 
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other polities, often as a result of conquest. In imperial thinking, 
which is based on elements such as territorial expansion, strate-
gic depth, and competition for spheres of influence, the key con-
cept is that of the enemy; it orders the philosophy of existing in an 
international environment.
The ‘imperial-superpower’ paradigm is reflected in Russia’s 
attempts to apply a hierarchical model of inter-state relations 
to the international environment which is of a fundamental-
ly anarchic character. In the hierarchical model postulated 
by Moscow states have different rights depending on the degree 
of their self-sufficiency, and full sovereignty is only an attribute 
of the great powers. This manifests itself in demands to construct 
a ‘multipolar order’ and a de facto ‘concert of powers’ – the division 
of spheres of influence among the strongest players. The actions 
of the powers in those zones would be entirely sovereign, that is, 
free from the evaluations of the ‘international community’, such 
as is currently taking place in Russia, where the state’s author-
ity is limited only by the current interests of the decision-makers. 
This would also create a kind of ‘strategic depth’, in terms of pro-
tecting Putin’s regime from a diffusion of liberal values approach-
ing the borders of the state too closely.
This vision, and above all Russia’s right to implement it, is in-
tended to be legitimised by the historical policy of a super-
power, drawing primarily from the heritage of the Soviet Union, 
but also from earlier periods; one constant element is the asso-
ciation of positive moments from history almost exclusively with 
military victories and conquests. Its founding element is the vic-
tory over Nazism in 1945, which – contrary to historical truth – is 
increasingly being presented as something Russia achieved on its 
own. Victory is associated not so much with its cooperation with 
the Allies as with the later confrontation of the Cold War, and the 
fabric of the myth of war and victory is a messianic idea, com-
bined with a thesis about the Soviet Union’s absolute moral supe-
riority over the rest of the world, owed to war martyrology.
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The resuscitation of the superpower heritage, in both domes-
tic and foreign terms, is intended to serve as a kind of com-
pensation for the still-raw trauma caused by the breakup of 
the Soviet Union and its consequences. The Russian elite has 
drawn the conclusion from that period that the key threat both to 
the security of the ruling class and the position of the state on the 
international stage (meaning primarily the ability to block exter-
nal impulses to change) is the weakness of the state’s institutions: 
the inability of the government to exert full control over domestic 
socio-political processes. This conviction is common to all authori-
tarian regimes, but in Russia it has been reinforced with the fresh 
experience of the disintegration of the state and its consequences 
for the ruling elite.9 Of no little importance in this context was the 
weakness and dysfunction of the Russian state (above all, the in-
stitution of the Presidency) in the 1990s which, although it creat-
ed unprecedented opportunities for the elite to enrich themselves 
in the terms of the predatory ‘market democracy’, posed serious 
threats to its representatives.10 Preventing another collapse and 
striving for full control of the domestic situation became an idée 
fixe for Putin’s generation. It became established as a certainty 
that dismantling Russia’s traditional authoritarian model (in the 
spirit of Gorbachev or Yeltsin) would pose a lethal threat to the vi-
tal interests of the narrow elite.11 This conviction was exacerbated 
9 This experience is associated, among others, with Vladimir Putin’s person-
al experiences on 5 December 1989 in Dresden: a crowd of demonstrators 
stormed the HQ of the Stasi, and it was feared there would also be an attack 
that day on the local branch of the KGB, which Putin then commanded. The 
Soviet military units stationed nearby refused to assist him without orders 
from Moscow, and Moscow itself did not respond to requests for such orders. 
At that time Putin suffered what he has referred to as the ‘paralysis of power’: 
the humiliating experience of the state's powerlessness was interwoven with 
his fear for his own safety, http://inosmi.ru/politic/20170227/238781368.html
10 As in the case of the bloody events of autumn 1993, when parliament intro-
duced a procedure to impeach President Boris Yeltsin (this domestic political 
crisis ended with the shelling of the parliament building).
11 In this context, two situations seem particularly emblematic: the initially 
real risk of Yeltsin losing the 1996 presidential elections (which would also 
have meant a defeat for the whole Yeltsin team); and the investigation initi-
ated against Anatoliy Sobchak, the former mayor of St. Petersburg, which 
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by the specific character of Putin’s regime which – as something 
much more personalised and less institutionalised than the So-
viet regime – is inherently more susceptible to shocks.
In this context, an essential element of Russia’s modern foreign 
policy has been that the erosion of the state in the Soviet Union’s 
twilight period (especially in the years of Gorbachev’s pere-
stroika), and then under the Yeltsin regime, is, in the eyes of 
the Putin regime, the fault of the West, specifically the United 
States. The Kremlin perceives international relations according 
to the paradigm of ‘the clash of civilisations’; in this approach, 
the international arena is not so much a field of coexistence, but 
rather a battle between various models of identity and internal 
organisation. In the game to strengthen its own international po-
sition, the West – as Russia sees it – is committed to the diffusion 
of its own constitutional model, and is trying to dismantle its ri-
vals’ systems of governance and undermine their statehood with 
the aim of weakening their position on the global stage.
This is a kind of mental holdover from the period of the Cold War’s 
confrontation between political blocs, when proxy wars and cam-
paigns of (dis)information were aimed at discrediting and un-
dermining the internal stability of their main opponents. In the 
Russian viewpoint, one of the key tools of the Western proxy 
wars is the attempt to promote the model of liberal democ-
racy. Moscow sees this not as a stand-alone axiological model, 
which enjoys genuine popularity in many societies, but only as 
a tool of American hegemony, something cynically used as an in-
strument of imperial policy, for overthrowing ‘truly sovereign’ 
(i.e. authoritarian) governments. Threats to the regime are thus 
raised to the rank of existential threats to the state itself. 
Also visible here is the association with the Soviet period, when 
also directly threatened Putin (both were implicated in illegal financial op-
erations when they worked together in the Town Hall; in 1997 Sobchak – with 
the help of Putin, who was then deputy head of the President's Administra-
tion – saved himself by fleeing abroad).
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top-down consent to the cautious adoption of elements of Western 
constitutional patterns in order to reform the state led not only to 
uncontrolled socio-political and economic changes, but also to the 
collapse of the state body. In this understanding, the bounda-
ries between internal and external threats become blurred, 
which in turn leads to “a blurring of the contours of inter-state 
conflicts, which allows Russia to take part in armed conflicts in 
which it is not officially a party”12 (as in the conflicts with Georgia 
in 2008 and with Ukraine in 2014).
George Kennan’s diagnosis from 1946 therefore remains valid: the 
sense of threat that consumes the Russian elite results from the 
awareness that their system of governance is archaic, has a weak 
ideological base, and would not withstand competition from the 
much more attractive Western system.13 This rules out a coopera-
tive model of international relations, as the Russian system is per-
manently trying to strengthen its defences. Moscow’s attitude to 
the liberal Western political mainstream is characterised by 
intrinsic suspicion, and is subject to the overriding objective of 
maintaining power at all costs, while aiming to strengthen Rus-
sia’s international position on its own terms.
Particularly in this context, the wave of ‘colour revolutions’ in 
the 2000s, the ‘Arab spring’, the civil war in Syria, and above all 
the Ukrainian Maidan (2013-2014) all revived the Russian elite’s 
fear of a possible loss of power, revealed its uncertainty of its so-
cial legitimacy, and filled it with what seems to be a real fear of 
being overthrown as a result of a conspiracy led by Washington 
(the elite’s anti-Western attitude was also previously affected by, 
among other events, the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 and the 
12 J. Darczewska, The devil is in the details. Information warfare in the light of 
Russia's military doctrine, OSW Point of View, 19 May 2015, https://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-view/2015-05-19/devil-details-information-
warfare-light-russias-military-doctrine
13 Kennan’s Long Telegram, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/
episode-1/kennan.htm
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war in Iraq; for Moscow, these events were conclusive proof that 
US foreign policy was based on undertaking special operations 
under the banner of humanitarian intervention). One personal 
trauma for Vladimir Putin was the protests in 2011-2012 that fol-
lowed his resumption of the office of President (he accused the 
US State Department of directly inspiring and supporting the 
protests).14 In this way the Kremlin resuscitated the Soviet tradi-
tion of legitimising its authority on the basis of confrontation with 
the West, finally overcoming the legacy of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, 
which had been based on the idea of cooperation.
3. The dysfunction of the economic system
The elite’s culturally and historically conditioned fears of internal 
destabilisation are compounded by the lack of prospects for Rus-
sia’s economic development. The source of the problem is both 
the authoritarian state’s pursuit of control over all areas of activity, 
which is deadly for the economy, and the pathologies of the raw-ma-
terials model of development, which have been accruing for decades. 
The statistical data on Russia’s GDP, its industrial production and 
investment dynamics clearly expose the weaknesses of the klepto-
cratic system based on corruption, which to a great degree runs in 
opposition to the principles of the free market. This is a specific stage 
in the evolution of the Putin model: the spectre of years of stag-
nation means that economic failure should be treated as one of its 
14 http://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2011/12/111208_putin_opposition_
protests.shtml. The activation of social protests in Russia in 2017 has fuelled 
the fears of the authorities. (For more see J. Strzelecki, I. Wiśniewska, 
M. Menkiszak, Antyrządowe protesty w Rosji, Analizy OSW, 27 March 2017, 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2017-03-27/antyrzadowe-
protesty-w-rosji; J. Strzelecki, M. Domańska, Antykorupcyjne protesty 
w Rosji, Analizy OSW, 13 June 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/
analizy/2017-06-13/antykorupcyjne-protesty-w-rosji). One manifestation 
of these fears is the creation in June 2017 of the Federation Council commit-
tee for the prevention of external tampering in the affairs of the country, 
including interference carried out with the use of NGOs; http://www.in-
terfax.ru/russia/568115
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permanent features.15 This raises potential political risks for the re-
gime, but has made carrying out any structural reforms even more 
risky for the ruling elite’s own interests.
In this way, the Russian government finds itself trapped by the 
need to permanently replicate the existing system of government 
while resources are dwindling and the elite’s financial appetites 
remain huge. This model can only work at the expense of the gen-
eral public, and at the same time its endurance requires appeals 
to false, patrimonial axioms about the community of interests be-
tween the public and the government, an approach which is root-
ed in Russian political tradition. This dilemma can be resolved 
only by shifting the reference point on which the govern-
ment/public relationship is based, from domestic issues (the 
classic model in which the government’s efficiency is assessed ac-
cording to the criteria of economic development, standards of liv-
ing, the efficiency of state institutions and the public’s confidence 
in them) to external issues (the primacy of national security and 
prestige, and the position of the state on the international stage).
The overriding aim of anti-Western propaganda in Russia, 
therefore, is to mobilise support for the government, despite 
the substantive quality-of-life problems which are being in-
creasingly clearly felt by the population.16 Once again, this 
draws upon a specific interpretation of the experience of the dis-
solution of the USSR, when poverty and inertia were accompanied 
by the abandonment of the traditional compensatory mobilisation 
of the public based on confrontation with the West. So the ear-
lier Soviet propaganda tropes have been reactivated, referring to 
15 For details see M. Domańska, Crisis in Russia. The degradation of the model 
of economic governance, OSW Studies, 3 March 2017, https://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2017-03-03/crisis-russia-degradation-model-
economic-governance. Statistics from Rosstat: www.gks.ru
16 Real income has decreased since November 2014, and by May 2017 may 
have decreased by more than 19%. See www.gks.ru and https://isp.hse.ru/
monitoring
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the motives of the enemy and the ‘besieged fortress’, explaining 
the socio-economic problems as the result of ‘Western plotting’.17 
The logic of the ‘state of emergency’ adopted by the authorities as-
sumes that in an emergency situation, the people will prefer to 
entrust their fate to the elite as being more competent in the field 
of crisis management. This kind of impulse works strongly, but is 
relatively brief in effect, and so it requires regular feeding, esca-
lating the atmosphere of risk to a practically military level (hence, 
for example, the acute criticism of ‘NATO’s expansion eastwards’). 
This completely changes both the source of the leader’s legitimacy 
and the language of communication between the government and 
the people; in symbolic terms the leader is not merely an effective 
manager, but the chief defender of the homeland and the nation 
from existential threat.
These efforts are amplified by attempts to cope with the lack of 
a legitimising ideology (a typical problem of authoritarian sys-
tems). What has been created is an inconsistent, eclectic model of 
pseudo-conservatism based on a  discourse drawing on national 
dignity,18 whose sole purpose is to build a national identity around 
the idea of the absolute subordination of the individual to the state. 
In the absence of any positive values, the axis of this model is the 
discreditation en bloc of Western liberal-democratic values, as be-
ing allegedly unbefitting of Russia’s cultural and historical speci-
ficity, and downright harmful to the spiritual-moral dimension of 
the nation’s identity, and thus as something fundamentally anti-
state. This kind of thinking is intended to preserve and reproduce 
17 The flagship example of falsifying the discourse is the argument that the 
Western sanctions, which are mainly targeted at Russia's political elite, are 
responsible for the general public's falling standards of living. Aside from the 
obvious fact that the sanctions were a response to Russia's aggression against 
Ukraine, the rising prices and the deterioration in the quality of food were 
caused not by Western sanctions, but by the Russian embargo on imports of 
many food articles which was introduced in response to them.
18 This focuses around the slogans of Russia ‘rising from its knees’, of its nurtur-
ing the true values of European civilisation, its rich national cultural herit-
age, and its resistance to the ‘moral corruption’ of the West.
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in Russian society the mental tropes which consolidate social ac-
ceptance for the Putin model. Not coincidentally, in this context the 
social trauma of the 1990s is exploited – the trauma of the failed 
transformation whose costs were borne above all by the general 
public; it is intended to overshadow their current material prob-
lems. The chaos and personal dramas which millions of people ex-
perienced after the dissolution of the empire are being associated 
in official discourse with attempts to implant the ‘foreign’, ‘hostile’ 
axiological, political and economic model upon Russian soil.
At the same time, the Russian authorities are concerned that 
these attempts may only be effective for a limited time. Hence 
the emphasis they place on ‘negotiations’ with the West, or on try-
ing to force it – with the aid of blackmail, lobbying, espionage or 
information warfare – to return to ‘business as usual’ (which was 
disturbed by Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine and the resulting 
introduction of sanctions), even though Moscow is continuing its ag-
gressive foreign policy. Lucrative contracts, Western investments, 
a return to full membership of ‘decision-makers’ clubs’ such as the 
G8 would guarantee Russia financial transfers and thus remove the 
spectre of public protests, while at the same time providing more 
support for a propaganda of success, and therefore doubly reinforc-
ing Putin’s regime. By bandying around false slogans of being ready 
for ‘constructive cooperation’, Russia wants to push the West into 
consolidating a system that in essence remains anti-Western: 
its anti-Western nature is being enforced not by the state’s current 
interests, but by the inherent nature of the authoritarian model of 
government. The Russian vision of this ‘cooperation’ is thus just as 
parasitic in nature as the relation of the Russian elite to the general 
public. This vision assumes maximalising the material and prestige 
benefits and the political power exercised by the Russian govern-
ment, which would allow it to ruthlessly force its partners to act in 
accordance with the interests of the Russian Federation.19
19 This strategy also has a purely individual, vested-interest dimension, as 
members of the Russian elite locate their assets in the West in search for 
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Any explanation of Moscow’s methods of operation in the area 
between open confrontation and pseudo-cooperation requires us 
to delve into the substance of the individual and group mentali-
ties of the ruling elite. This influences the specific features of Rus-
sian authoritarianism, and determines fundamental difference 
of Russian political culture from that of the West – a difference 
which often causes communication problems and misperceptions 
about Russia’s intentions.
guarantees of their property and security interests (the property laws in 
Russia are of rather a conventional character). However, this kind of ‘inte-
gration’ with the West on an individual level does not mean there have been 
any changes at the level of the anti-Western group mentality.
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II. the mentalIty of the rulIng elIte and 
Its Influence on russIa’s foreIgn PolIcy
In order to understand the logic directing how Russia’s decision-
makers reflect on foreign policy, not only in the dimension of its 
worldview but also operationally (the choices of instruments and 
working methods), it is necessary to analyse the consequences of 
the individual and generational experiences which formed the po-
litical careers of today’s ruling elite, including Vladimir Putin him-
self and his ‘inner circle’ (i.e. his closest friends and advisors). The 
shape of the ruling elite’s collective mentality is largely based 
upon the strong position of the people in it who are linked to 
the special services and the other ‘structures of force’, which 
have transferred the mindset, habits and working methods of the 
‘Chekists’ environment onto the policy of the state.20 At the same 
time, the ethos and the range of methods used by the special ser-
vices are being strengthened as a result of the filtering through 
into Russian policy of the rules governing the criminal world.
1. The ‘Chekist’ features
The mass influx of ‘Chekists’ into business and the structures of 
power had already begun under President Yeltsin: at the time of 
the USSR’s dissolution, certain groups of ‘people from the services’ 
20 In the strict sense of the word, the ‘Chekists’ were officers of the ChK, the Ex-
traordinary Commission for the Struggle against Counter-Revolution and Sab-
otage operating in the years 1917-1922; in the broader sense, the term refers to 
officers of the state security authorities, including the FSB (the heirs of the So-
viet KGB, NKVD and ChK), the Federal Security Service and the Foreign Intelli-
gence Service. ‘Chekists’ are one category of a wider range of ‘siloviki’, which in 
Russia includes the army and special services, the border guards, the organs of 
the internal affairs departments, the National Guard, the Federal Penitentiary 
Service and others. From a functional point of view, the ‘structures of power’ 
must also be said to include the public prosecutor and the Investigative Com-
mittee, which in Russian reality is the tool of the Russian executive authority 
and an instrument of repression. The system of government in the Putin period 
is often referred to as the ‘Chekistocracy’ because of its leader’s professional 
background, but also because of the noticeable strengthening of this group in 
the Russian power structures since the year 2000.
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gained access to important political and economic-financial infor-
mation, and took control of huge assets inherited from the Sovi-
et period. This money went into the creation of commercial and 
banking empires. In the mid-1990s there were hardly any big 
businesses which were not under the leadership of former KGB 
employees. In the second half of the decade they began to pene-
trate the structures of the state.21 The two Chechen wars made it 
easier for the institutions of repression to build up their position 
within the state by accustoming the general public to a ‘special 
operations regime’, violence, and the use of emergency measures. 
The mission of the ‘siloviki’ was to break with the inheritance of 
the 1990s, to ‘restore order’ to a state in chaos.22 Their current po-
sition in the system, however, is not a simple continuation of the 
Soviet tradition.23
The participation of representatives of the power structures 
in the organs of Russia’s central government and regional 
bodies has increased significantly since Vladimir Putin’s rise 
to power. This figure is assessed at from around 20% to 40% of 
the ruling elite; their importance, however, derives not so much 
by their number as the important decision-making positions they 
are given.24 One example is the crucial importance of the Security 
21 Спецслужбы в российской экономике и политике, http://www.ippnou.
ru/print/010250/
22 Операция «Внедрение» завершена!, interview with Olga Kryshtanovs-
kaya, 30 August 2004, http://2004.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2004/63n/n63n-
s43.shtml
23 Whereas in the Soviet Union these services were controlled by the Party and 
lacked many of the rights they have today, the FSB is much more powerful 
and is responsible only to the President, who himself has his roots in the KGB.
24 For details see D. W. Rivera & Sharon Werning Rivera, Is Russia a militocracy? 
Conceptual issues and extant findings regarding elite militarization, Post-
Soviet Affairs 30:1, 2014; O. Kryshtanovskaya, Sovietization of Russia 2000-
2008, Eurasian Review vol. 2, November 2009. Kryshtanovskaya estimates 
the percentage of ‘siloviki’ in the senior ranks of government at around 40% in 
2008, although she emphasises that many officers from the special services 
do not officially admit to their professional affiliation, especially those who 
are in the second rank, such as vice-ministers or deputy governors.
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Council – a body dominated by the siloviki – in drawing up deci-
sions concerning the broader internal and external security of 
the state. The most significant determinant of the ‘Chekists’ im-
portance to the political system, however, is the dissemination 
of their mentality and ethics among the ‘civilian’ part of the 
elite: in the era of Putin “there have been formed among the elite 
specific codes and standards, a matrix that allows the reproduc-
tion of the model – not necessarily by directly planting [govern-
ment institutions] with the representatives of the corporations 
of power, but through entrenched norms and mechanisms of 
operation”.25 These include a suspicious, closed-off way of think-
ing, formed during the Soviet era, as well as the perception of of-
ficial policy as an area of lies and deception into which the unau-
thorised cannot penetrate.26
The siloviki’s strong position in the decision-making circles 
affects Russian foreign policy in two ways, at both the ideo-
logical and operational levels. First, the degree to which the state 
administration has been penetrated by the services and the mu-
tual rivalry between them mean that, in order to maximise their 
influence and financial benefits, they must try to demonstrate 
that Russia is constantly under threat: ‘if the special services are 
there, then there must be an enemy there too’.27 The definition of 
the ‘enemy’ is derived from the Soviet logic of confrontation be-
tween power blocs, where Washington and NATO are still the tra-
ditional adversaries: after all, it was the siloviki who ran (and lost) 
the Cold War.28 Even before the deterioration of the relationship 
with the West, the special services were convinced that Russia is 
under threat from a serious, even existential danger that requires 
25 Н. Петров, Построение силовиков, www.vedomosti.ru, 25 July 2016.
26 A. Soldatov, M. Rochlitz, The Siloviki in Russian Politics, https://static1.squa-
res pace.com/static/55510affe4b06afeca50df07/t/57d3923859cc684a2328 54-
60 / 147 3483331787/Siloviki+Final+Aug+17+.pdf
27 Операция «Внедрение» завершена!, op. cit.
28 Почему мы не любим Америку, www.vedomosti.ru, 24 April 2016.
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radical countermeasures.29 Thus, although the rivalry between 
the services may have negative consequences for the current po-
sition of individual services within the system, at the same time it 
deepens the authoritarian and confrontational tendencies of the 
system itself towards the international environment.
Secondly, due to their professional viewpoint, these circles are 
characterised by thinking in terms of a permanent special opera-
tion, as well as by a high propensity to take risks.30 This fits in with 
their belief that the international sphere of the state’s activity is 
primarily a field of competition between special services, where 
the activity of ‘civilians’ is of secondary importance. There is thus 
no room for the participation of the ‘technocratic’ elites, such as 
the economic bloc of the government, in the decision-making pro-
cess; by the very extent of their competence in the sphere of prag-
matic economic cooperation, they would be more willing to adopt 
the Western viewpoint of a ‘positive-sum game’. In the view of the 
special services, ‘cooperation’ with the West is seen as a way for 
the West to infiltrate Russia – unless it means that the Russian 
services are infiltrating the West.
The moment when the interests of the power structures coin-
cided with the neo-imperial logic of the authoritarian system 
and the interests of the ‘civilian’ decision-makers was the pro-
tests in Russia at the end of 2011 and the start of 2012, and ulti-
mately, another ‘colour revolution’ in Ukraine in 2013-14. In Rus-
sian thinking, ‘colour revolutions’ are treated as the ‘most socially 
dangerous way of special services coming into conflict’,31 and the 
embodiment of all the Kremlin’s fears at the same time. The ideol-
ogy of the special services, anti-Western and based on the eter-
nal search for an enemy, has thus become an essential element 
29 M. Galeotti, Putin’s Hydra: Inside Russia’s Intelligence Services, May 2016, 
www.ecfr.eu
30 Ibid.
31 J. Darczewska, The devil..., op. cit., p. 32.
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in the service of the regime and the state’s leadership.32 Since the 
‘Crimean spring’, the Russian elite’s thinking has been deter-
mined to an even greater extent than before by the logic of the 
zero-sum game:33 the West is either an enemy or a competitor,34 an 
approach which has deprived the siloviki’s viewpoint of any real 
counterweight.
This phenomenon also has another important dimension: the in-
creasingly bitter struggle for dwindling resources, and – as a side 
effect – the special services’ increasing lawlessness under the slo-
gan of the alleged ‘fight against corruption’35 mean that “public 
anti-Americanism and support for the annexation of Crimea have 
taken on the nature of a ritual in which the elite confirms its loy-
alty to the political regime”, and in which pro-Western groups are 
thus treated as ‘foreign’.36
One consequence of the Chekist/special-service viewpoint 
is the selection of tools to implement Russian foreign policy. 
32 Thereupon the situation became a pretext for the ‘siloviki’ to strengthen their 
pressure on society and consolidate their own position in the Russian politi-
cal system.
33 Д. Волков, Настроения российских элит после Крыма, www.carnegie.ru, 
November 2015.
34 As Vladislav Surkov, then deputy head of the President's Administration, 
slyly put it in 2005: at that time he described Europeans not as enemies, but 
competitors, which ironically meant he would have to fight them even hard-
er. According to Surkov, “An enemy – that's when you can die heroically in 
a war. And losing a competitive battle – that means being a loser. And that's 
doubly offensive.” From an unauthorised transcript of a speech: www.ng.ru/
politics/2005-07-13/1_suverenitet.html
35 Starting from 2015, there has been an escalation in the struggle within the 
Russian elite, whose tool – and beneficiary – is often the special services 
(mainly the FSB). This struggle is fought under the banner of the fight against 
corruption, and the victims are mainly senior regional officials (including 
a number of governors). The real goal of this campaign, however, is the re-
distribution of property and political influence, and not the eradication of 
corruption as a fundamental phenomenon of the system (because it still gen-
erates huge profits for the government's highest policy makers, led by the 
President and Prime Minister).
36 Д. Волков, Настроения..., op. cit.
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These include classic activities from the realm of soft power (prop-
aganda, manipulation of information), as well as the arsenal (cov-
ert and overt) of political and special-service policies (infiltration, 
sabotage, open disinformation,37 the threat of the use of force, or 
even force itself). This way of working is, on the one hand, sub-
ject to the principles of efficiency and flexibility (the choice of 
methods is a secondary matter), and on the other, to the princi-
ple of prevention. The conviction is strong that in the paradigm 
of conflict which frames the relationship between Russia and the 
West, attack is the best form of defence, and the attacker has a bet-
ter chance of winning.38 Hence the tendency to intimidate the op-
ponent with feigned unpredictability, creating the impression 
that Moscow is ready to undertake unreasonable actions. This 
‘management by unpredictability’ is intended not only to confuse 
or blackmail the enemy, but also to allow the widest possible scope 
for flexible methods of operation and response in Russia’s foreign 
policy. The culmination of this strategy was Russia’s aggression in 
Ukraine and its intervention in Syria: in the Kremlin’s perspec-
tive, independently of any other (mainly geopolitical) goals, these 
operations are preventive proxy wars against the United States. 
Although the action in both these situations was carried out un-
der different sets of conditions and served different purposes, the 
most important is the defence of authoritarianism as a peer of the 
liberal-democratic political model.
One of the key tools of foreign policy as a ‘special operation’ 
is the language of information dissemination, used both as an 
instrument of sabotage on the international stage, and as justi-
fication of the purpose and methods of the state’s foreign policy 
37 Russia assumes that the war is being directed in the minds of its participants, 
hence the importance placed on disinformation operations. K. Giles, Russia’s 
‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West. Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s 
Exercise of Power, March 2016, www.chathamhouse.org
38 “50 years ago, the Leningrad street taught me: If a fight is inevitable, you 
had better hit first.” Statement by Putin from October 2015; https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=98x2Z3rHbxk
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on the domestic stage. The language of the authorities reflects the 
very substance of the mentality and habits of the special services, 
as well as the still extant Soviet code (‘double-think’39), which 
has been enhanced with the communication codes of the crimi-
nal world (of which more later). This in turn corresponds to the 
phenomenon, familiar to Western reality, of ‘post-truth’. All these 
patterns reject the possibility of coming to an agreement with 
the use of language, both because of the conscious intent to falsify 
the intention of communication, and because of the annihilation 
of meanings. The primary function of language here is not to name 
and explain, but to manipulate. Words in their traditional expres-
sion are used to signal an intention contrary to the real. This is 
how the word ‘cooperation’ should be considered, as meaning sub-
ordination, ‘humanitarian intervention’: armed aggression, ‘Na-
zis’: opponents of the Kremlin. Those who communicate their real 
intentions with words – referents to reality – are seen as having 
revealed their weaknesses, leaving themselves open to blows.
In the case of propaganda addressed directly to Western societies, 
the maximum target is to disseminate the Russian point of view, 
and to bring about those societies’ active opposition to the narra-
tive of their own governments. The minimum aim is the perma-
nent breaking of ties between words and their meanings: such 
semantic chaos is intended to bring about total relativism in the 
assessment of reality. The aim is to cast doubt in the power of ob-
jective information, especially regarding reports coming from Rus-
sia’s opponents or victims, and to cause passivity to the expansion of 
Russian influence. Poisoning the flow of information with lies and 
disinformation is also intended to create a decision-making context 
for foreign leaders by providing them with crafted content.40
The Chekist ‘philosophy of language’ is associated with 
the specific attitude of the President and his immediate 
39 See Chapter III, p. 1.
40 K. Giles, Russia’s ‘New’ Tools..., op. cit.
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environment towards the incoming information they re-
ceive. The information considered important in principle is exclu-
sively secret information which has been obtained by espionage 
and counter-espionage, while any information which is generally 
available is treated as deliberate disinformation.41 This represents 
the direct projection of the authoritarian system’s mechanisms 
(the Kremlin finances disinformation aimed at Western audi-
ences) onto the practices used in liberal democracies. This often 
results in the dismissal of public statements issued by Western 
policy makers and press reports, and a preference for personal, 
covert contacts and behind-the-scenes negotiations,42 which also 
offer the option of blackmailing partners later.
It is hard to believe that such deeply ingrained habits of perceiv-
ing language and communication as methods of sabotage and geo-
political struggle could be changed if Moscow simply announced 
a change in its political course in the direction of another ‘reset’. 
It should be assumed that the rhetoric of such a ‘reset’ will serve 
a similar function – to subject the enemy to confusion and thus 
manipulate him with it.
2. The features of the ‘criminal world’
Although most representatives of the contemporary Russian po-
litical and business elite were educated and began their profes-
sional activity under the Soviet system, the moment which was 
ultimately formative in their political culture, also in foreign 
policy, was primarily the period of constitutional transfor-
mation in the 1990s. At that time, the uncontrolled dismantling 
of the Soviet model of government, the economy and society was 
accompanied by the construction of a specific, anarchic quasi-de-
mocracy and a Darwinist, criminal proto-capitalism. Against the 
41 А. Гольц, Страна победившего милитаризма, Контрапункт 5, September 
2016, p. 7.
42 Ibid.
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background of the dissolution of the existing structures and in-
stitutions, the deepening dysfunction of the state and law, a broad 
field opened up for rapid albeit risky business and political ca-
reers, but also for the flowering of the activities of the organised 
criminal groups which had first appeared in the Soviet Union in 
the 1970s. Due to the crisis of state power, including the admin-
istration of justice, and the temptation of huge profits related to 
trading in raw materials or the ‘wild’ privatisations, liberated 
from the supervision of an ailing state, the struggle for influence 
in these circumstances was particularly ruthless.
The intermingling of politics with the criminal world,43 the rise in 
the links between criminal groups and the interests of the repre-
sentatives of federal and regional government,44 and also the fact 
that the fight for financial assets and influence often went liter-
ally to the death, resulted in the transfer of mafia-style think-
ing and methods onto state policy. In this way the ethos of the 
Soviet nomenklatura, which had operated in the conditions of 
a closed planned economy and been forced into the straitjacket of 
Soviet state structures, was replaced by a quasi-criminal ethos, 
governed by the rules of political Darwinism. The Russian po-
litical context of the 1990s therefore permits the identification of 
similarities between the current culture of the political sa-
lons of power and the criminal ethics of the underworld, as 
manifested in the attitudes and statements on foreign policy ex-
pressed by high-level Russian officials.
43 Members of organised crime groups were then commonly hired to undertake 
political and economic retaliation; they also built up their financial empires 
through the infiltration of state politics.
44 This text presents only some general reflections on the subject. Details of the 
biographies of the political and business members of the Russian President's 
‘inner circle’, as well as information on the realities of the political-business 
world in the 1990s and the subsequent period, confirming the thesis pre-
sented in this text, are fully described by, among others, Karen Dawisha in 
Putin’s Kleptocracy. Who Owns Russia?, New York 2015.
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This culture is characterised by several key mechanisms of 
thought and action, which are permanently rooted in the do-
mestic politics of Russia and have been projected onto the realm 
of foreign policy. First of all there has been an absolutisation of 
the category of power, the determinant of which is its domi-
nant position and strength, which is constantly being confirmed. 
The use of force has become permanently embedded among 
the instruments of the struggle for wealth and influence as 
a way of settling conflicts, including economic conflicts. At the 
same time, participation in the game of dividing the spoils after 
the Soviet Union required a high readiness to take risks – the 
possible profits were gigantic, but they came hand in hand with 
a high price tag. In the political thought of the Russian elite, this 
gave rise to an identification of the power one possessed with ma-
terial resources obtained illegally or semi-legally, and with per-
sonal security. In conditions of fighting without formal rules, all 
kinds of tricks were allowed, provided they were effective. The 
post-Soviet elite generation, which had been tempered in the era 
of ‘wild capitalism’, therefore acknowledges the logic of ‘winner 
takes all’, which means that by definition the interests of a com-
petitor or opponent are not taken into account.45
These principles are reflected in the methods employed in Rus-
sian foreign policy. Each international game is treated as an all-
or-nothing contest; the position of the state and the elite requires 
constant confirmation and a series of successes (at least in propa-
ganda), and the threshold of tolerance for risk is much higher in 
the case of the Russian elite than for the Western elites, for whom 
– in the face of a democratic rotation of governments – a loss of 
power or prestige is rarely seen as the end of the world. As when 
criminals settle their scores, the arsenal of measures to be used is 
not defined a priori, there are no rules imposed ahead of time, no 
45 Пути российского посткоммунизма. Очерки, ред. М. Липман, А. Рябов, 
Moscow 2007, p. 70.
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‘red lines’ that should not be crossed; this results in the brutalisa-
tion of Moscow’s political activities.
This flexibility of the instruments used in this all-out war for 
survival has enhanced the ability, learned in the Soviet socio-po-
litical and economic reality, to function simultaneously in the 
worlds of formal and informal rules, of written laws and cus-
tomary norms (poniatiya);46 and also alternately and flexibly to 
use instruments from both these registers, from the realms 
of legality and illegality. The ‘poniatiya’, these customary norms, 
have absolute precedence over written law in the field of regulat-
ing the relationships between the superiors and the inferiors. 
They draw upon strength and patrimonial interdependencies as 
sources of law. This model has not changed fundamentally in the 
Putin era, despite the apparent strengthening of state structures 
in comparison with the Yeltsin period. In a corrupt system, it is 
personal loyalty and interests, and not formal rules and obliga-
tions, which mutually binds the participants together; repre-
sentatives of the state bodies, including the departments of force, 
often cooperate closely with the criminal world in their search for 
profits.47
The specific ethos of the ruling elite and the way it conducts its 
international policy also includes the standards governing the 
model of leadership in the criminal world. The rules of conduct 
are determined by the ideal of ‘hegemonic masculinity’,48 one of 
the most important determinants of the fundamental differences 
that exist between Western and Russian political culture, the 
understanding of the rules of politics, including the savoir-vivre 
governing diplomatic contacts. This means – next to the classic 
46 ‘Poniatiya’, literally ‘things understood’, is one of the key elements of the 
criminal (and prison) code of conduct – the unwritten rules of conduct, 
known only to those who have been made privy to it, to 'our guys' (свои).
47 S. Stephenson, Gangs of Russia. From the streets to the corridors of power, 
2015, pp. 80, 84, 227, 231.
48 Ibid.
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characteristics of the leader, such as his ability to demonstrate 
the hardness of his character, his courage or earning respect – 
his ability to intimidate an opponent: the position of the leader 
within a group is determined by his readiness to demonstrate 
strength, to scorn the weak, to take revenge for real or alleged 
insults,49 though direct violence is used only when considered 
necessary. In foreign policy, this means the absolute primacy 
of rules imposing his own will on the dialogue; and courtesy, 
a willingness to compromise or to hold discussion are all seen as 
signs of weakness.50 The affirmation of strength therefore leads to 
a brutalisation of the language of foreign policy.51
In addition, the logic of the relationship with foreign partners re-
sembles the logic of the patron/client relationship in the in-
teractions between a criminal group and its external envi-
ronment. The strategy of activities is subjugated to the constant 
confirmation of the right to arbitrarily shape the rules on home 
soil, where the boundaries of the territory are determined by the 
group leader himself. This logic is based on the formation of an 
asymmetric interdependence with the surroundings, on the 
unilateral dependence of the ‘clients’ on the ‘protectors’ – in such 
a system, the parties do not have equal rights, and the ‘protector’ 
provides the ‘client’ with protection, first and foremost, from him-
self.52 Therefore it is not the potential benefit which comes to the 
fore, but rather the choice between minimising and maximising 
the potential for harm. Such a mechanism is clearly visible in the 
Russian discourse of global policy as addressed to the West, and in 
49 See Putin's use of criminal slang in an interview in February 2000: “Who-
ever touches us, he won't live three days”, http://www.1tv.ru/news/2000-
02-07/290442-analiticheskaya_programma_odnako_intervyu_v_v_putina
50 Cf. S. Stephenson, Gangs of Russia..., op. cit.
51 One representative example of this approach was the aggressive speech in 
April 2017 by Russia's deputy permanent representative to the United Na-
tions, Vladimir Safronkov; he deliberately offended the British Ambassador, 
who had been criticising Russia’s actions in Syria. The tone of the speech 
caused consternation among those assembled.
52 S. Stephenson, Gangs of Russia..., op. cit., p. 70.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
1/
20
17
37
Russia’s actions on the international stage. The creation of facts, in 
the form of a unilateral creation of threats to international securi-
ty, is followed by requests for negotiations and compromises from 
the opponent, concessions which will supposedly allow Moscow 
to put forward a solution to the problem which it created itself. 
A key concession which is always demanded is the recognition of 
the situation of asymmetrical interdependence, that is, granting 
Russia the right to unilaterally dictate terms, and consenting to 
a fundamental inequality of rights and obligations. This logic has 
been repeatedly revealed in Russia’s policy towards the frozen 
conflicts in the post-Soviet area, reaching its climax in its armed 
activities on the territories of Ukraine and Syria.
Also, according to the logic of the criminal, the ‘client’s coopera-
tion with the ‘protector’ does not oblige the latter to do anything. 
The rules of ethics or morals are characterised by a kind of 
quasi-tribal thinking; they are exclusive in nature, and are 
valid only in relation to their own group. Because the ‘alien’ is out-
side the world populated by one’s own kind, one does not need to 
take any account of him.53 In this way, the members of the group 
do not see lies or manipulation as anything offensive, still less so 
if they win. This precludes any respect for those rules of coop-
eration that were shaped in the Western paradigm of liberal de-
mocracy and the rule of law. Russian discourse, regardless of its 
subject matter (be that a historical issue, the implementation of 
international agreements, or the course of the conflict in Ukraine) 
regularly involve lies, not only at the level of communication in 
the media, but in international discussions at the highest level.54
In this context, the mistake commonly committed in the name of 
seeking an ‘understanding of Russia’ is based on the assumption 
53 Ibid., p. 232.
54 In this context, it is at least worth recalling the lies Vladimir Putin told dur-
ing his talks with Angela Merkel on the activity of Russian troops on the 
territory of Ukraine.
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that openness to dialogue and concessions from the West will lead 
to real compromise and appropriate concessions from Moscow. 
Meanwhile these same concessions are treated as weakness, and 
only encourage further demands, extortion and blackmail. The 
‘owner’ of the territory arbitrarily determines the law which ap-
plies in that territory, and this need not have anything to do with 
notions of justice.55
55 S. Stephenson, Gangs of Russia..., op. cit., pp. 178–9.
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III. the PublIc as an ally In the KremlIn’s 
confrontatIonal foreIgn PolIcy
The determinants of Moscow’s confrontational foreign policy, 
which result from the inherently authoritarian regime, its Rus-
sian-specific characteristics, and the mentality of the ruling elite, 
correspond to the historical-cultural subsoil from which the men-
tality of most of Russian society originates. To a great degree it 
accepts (passively or actively) the ideology and the toolkit of the 
Kremlin’s actions on the international stage. Regardless of the 
fascination with the Western model of economic development, 
and with Western culture itself, the anti-Western fears and com-
plexes of the Russians are often made clear as regards their as-
sessment of mutual political relations. The Kremlin’s anti-West-
ern propaganda would not be as effective were it not based on 
the deeply-rooted social matrices of the Russian world view, 
which have not been changed either by Russia opening up to the 
world after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, or by the evolu-
tion of individuals as a result of the subsequent socio-economic 
transformation. Pro-Western circles remain marginalised, and 
they will have no effect on the policy of the government in the 
foreseeable future.
1. Russian paternalism. The authoritarian personality
Social consent to the elite’s arbitrary definition of national inter-
est and their choice of measures to implement it is possible largely 
thanks to the deep roots in Russian history of the paternalist, hi-
erarchical model of the relationship between authority and the 
citizens. These relations are based on the assumption that the 
state, in the name of the proclaimed good of the citizen, is enti-
tled to restrict his rights and exercise control over him, thus re-
leasing him from responsibility for the shape of the surrounding 
reality. Society in Russia, then, is not the subject, but the object 
of politics; it is the victim, and not the partner of the authorities’ 
actions, which on the one hand are aimed at maintaining these 
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passive attitudes (thus neutralising the potential for active oppo-
sition), and on the other on instilling a set of beliefs, reinforced by 
official propaganda, aimed at obtaining at least declarative sup-
port for government policy. The guarantor of the existence and 
the reproduction of such a model is the authoritarian person-
ality, the ‘Soviet man’ type of character, who was formed in the 
era of Soviet totalitarianism and is still relatively widespread in 
Russian society.
The ‘Soviet man’ is characterised by his tendency to follow the au-
thority of the state in its assessment of reality, to adopt an attitude 
of mistrust and anxiety towards anything foreign and unknown, 
and is convinced of his own powerlessness and inability to affect 
the surrounding reality; from here, it is only a step towards lack-
ing any sense of responsibility for that reality.56 His suppressed 
aggression, birthed by his chronic dissatisfaction with life, his 
intense sense of injustice and his inability to achieve self-realisa-
tion, and his great envy, all erupt into a fascination with force and 
violence, as well as a tendency towards ‘negative identification’ – 
in opposition to ‘the enemy’ or ‘the foreigner’.57 Such a personal-
ity suits a quasi-tribal approach to standards of morality and law 
(the things ‘our people’ have a right to do are condemned in the 
‘foreigner’).58
These features translate into a tendency to self-isolation, to faith 
in the black and white, stereotypical, confrontational view of the 
world served up by Kremlin propaganda.59 ‘Soviet man’ suffers 
56 See the poll by the Levada Centre from July 2016: http://www.levada.
ru/2016/07/13/otvetstvennost-i-vliyanie/
57 In the case of the Russian people, this is not a temporary manifestation of the 
situational potential of collective mobilisation, but rather a deeply cultural 
feature. Л. Гудков, Негативная идентичность. Статьи 1997–2002 годов, 
Moscow 2004, pp. 156-7.
58 Л. Гудков, Повесть о советском человеке, Ведомости, 28 December 2016.
59 According to sociological research, about 90% of Russians derive their knowl-
edge of the world principally from national television, and no more than 30% 
use alternative sources of information. Почему мы не любим..., op. cit. 
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from the ‘imperial syndrome’60 and projects onto himself the 
achievements of past generations, which fills him with a sense of 
superiority to other nations. As compensation, in this context, he 
receives a belief in the particular, civilisational identity of Russia, 
based on a non-democratic system of values. For him, the state’s 
authority becomes the guarantor of order and the point of refer-
ence for his national identity. He can experience self-esteem only 
by identifying with the state: especially in times of trial, of the 
mobilisation of the whole community against a common enemy, 
which leads to his susceptibility to militaristic rhetoric. Person-
alities displaying such characteristics are easily guided and ma-
nipulate, but are also inert and resistant to change by nature.
According to the results of sociological research, people with this 
kind of personality type make up about 35-40% of the population 
of Russia, but individual characteristics or behavioural patterns 
appear at appropriate moments of mobilisation (economic, politi-
cal or social crises) in up to 80% of respondents. With regard to 
the strengthening of authoritarianism in Russia and the elimina-
tion of pluralism, this type of personality is beginning to come to 
the fore, and is moreover being reproduced in the younger gen-
erations.61
Open-access terrestrial television is monopolised by the discourse of the 
Kremlin, which in recent years has been built upon an often extreme anti-
Occidentalism, the hunt for domestic enemies (‘fifth column’), and narra-
tives exploiting the syndromes of the ‘besieged fortress’, the ‘conspiracy’, 
frequently drawing upon the complex of lost greatness and the rebirth of the 
superpower might of Russia.
60 This refers to a nostalgia for empire, a sense of historic defeat and inherent 
defectiveness as a result of the loss of empire, a susceptibility to ‘imperial 
populism’ serving slogans of revanchism, based on demands for a recon-
struction of lost greatness. To a great extent this syndrome cripples the abil-
ity to reflect rationally on the nature of the challenges facing Russia in the 
modern world.
61 Л. Гудков, Повесть..., op. cit. This reproduction occurs under the influence 
of social institutions descended from the totalitarian system, which have 
preserved their essence despite later modifications. These institutions are: 
the vertical system of power, beyond the supervision of the general public; 
the courts and parliament, which are subordinate to the executive govern-
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Authoritarian personality traits give rise to key determi-
nants of social attitudes, of a kind which foster the confron-
tational worldview as implemented in foreign policy: com-
pared with other Western societies, the boundaries of tolerance 
for certain phenomena lie in different places, and the list of ac-
tions or attitudes deemed acceptable or unacceptable is also dif-
ferent. Firstly, there is a widespread culture of violence, charac-
teristic of authoritarian reality, which is reinforced by the legacy 
of totalitarianism and the widespread use of violence as a regula-
tor of political, economic and social relations in the criminal re-
ality of the 1990s. Secondly, there is a profound relativism in the 
assessment of reality, arising primarily from the Soviet tradition 
of ‘doublethink’,62 as well as the understanding developed in the 
1990s of politics as something completely virtual, based entirely 
on manipulation and fraud. Thirdly, there is the ‘imperial syn-
drome’: a kind of resentment allowing compensation for the in-
feriority complex thanks to the anti-Western models (built up in 
the Soviet era) of a worldview seen through the prism of the (now 
lost) might of the superpower.
2. The culture of violence
The culture of violence – which by its very nature excludes dia-
logue and compromise, and is based on the assumption of the fun-
damental inequality of the participants in any interaction – has for 
centuries been the key regulator in the relationship between 
the state and the citizen in Russian reality. Violence is one of the 
ment; the existence of a political police and a conscript army; an extensive 
system of prisons and camps (‘the zone’); a lack of free elections and local 
government structures; and finally a school system that reproduces Soviet 
standards of education.
62 A term coined by George Orwell in his novel 1984, denoting the ability to 
demonstrate the simultaneous belief in mutually contradictory views. The 
ability to ‘doublethink’ is a mechanism for overcoming cognitive dissonance 
resulting from the incompatibility of the results of rational thought to the 
need, conditioned by the survival instinct, to demonstrate obedience to the 
content transmitted by official propaganda.
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fundamental elements of the system; it permeates all levels of the 
Russian state, and defines the real structure of superiority and sub-
ordination, regardless of the existing system of written law as for-
mally publicised. In its direct form, it is revealed both in the power 
relationship between the government and the people (the arbitrary 
behaviour of the special services, violations of human and civil 
rights, the expansion of the prison system as an instrument of po-
litical struggle), in relationships within the power elite (such as the 
use of the special services in the fight for influence among inter-
est groups), and in the domestic social context (violence as a way of 
resolving conflicts between people, something which is to a great 
extent the result of the dysfunction of the dimension of justice). 
It manifests itself in public life as the repression of political oppo-
nents, the omnipotence of corrupt officials, and the fiction of the 
legal code. While not taking on the form of mass terror (repressive 
means are  applied relatively selectively in their  direct form, usual-
ly against individuals who openly demonstrate against the regime), 
violence is deeply rooted in society’s mental matrix, which makes 
it easier to activate coercive mechanisms for political needs, in the 
absence of any broader bottom-up resistance.
On a social basis, violence has been ‘familiarised’ as part of 
everyday life, in large part due to the universality of the gulag 
experience in the Stalin period, and also as a result of Rus-
sia’s subsequent failure to punish those responsible for the 
terror. Attempts are made to justify it as the price for wielding 
the might of a superpower, and as a path towards  restoring order 
and justice. One illustration of the public’s attitude towards vio-
lence is how views of Stalin’s repression have changed. From 2012 
to 2017 the proportion of Russians who believe it was a political 
crime has fallen significantly (from 51% to 39%), and today 36% 
justify the crimes by the achievements of the Stalin era.63 Positive 
attitudes towards Stalin increased markedly in spring 2014, ac-
cording to sociologists: the beginning of the conflict with the West 
63 http://www.levada.ru/2017/05/23/stalinskie-repressii/
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spawned the need for a strong leader, something corresponding to 
familiar Soviet mythology. This is favoured by state propaganda, 
which glorifies or whitewashes Stalinism, taking on a state-cen-
tric viewpoint in which the government is always right.64
This mechanism was reinforced by the logic of the state of 
emergency which marked the first decade of the Russian 
Federation’s existence. The political crisis, which ended in the 
shelling of the Parliament building in 1993, and the two wars in 
Chechnya formed a specific scheme of the government’s legiti-
macy. This is based on a common belief that in a crisis threaten-
ing the community, a government which is maximally focused 
and unfettered will be more effective than one which is limited 
by democratic procedures: therefore it is not the law which is of 
value, but rather effectiveness. This meant the suspension of the 
principles of ethics and morals which apply in normal conditions. 
In this way the limits of tolerance for the use of exceptional and 
unconstitutional means, as well as for the extra-legal expansion 
of the government’s mandate to act, were permanently shifted, 
both in domestic and foreign policy. These models were updated 
once again, with full public support, early in spring 2014 during 
the conflict with Ukraine and the economic crisis, when the at-
mosphere of the ‘state of emergency’ was reactivated.
Justifying the state’s violence in the historical context promotes 
the acceptance of violence in contemporary circumstances. In ad-
dition, having become accustomed to the parasitic relationship 
between the government and the citizen, the mixture of fear, the 
sense of one’s own powerlessness and one’s shamefaced participa-
tion in the system results in at least a passive public acceptance 
of the use of violence in foreign policy, be this armed aggression 
on someone else’s territory, blackmail or intimidation. Sociologi-
cal surveys show that in Russia the exercise of government is 
64 Россияне стали безразличнее относиться к сталинским репрессиям, 
www.vedomosti.ru, 23 May 2017.
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associated not so much with authority as with force,65 and the 
ability to use violence (also in an arbitrary manner) is often 
associated with success.66 This phenomenon is reflected in pub-
lic opinion polls: at the beginning of 2017, after several years of 
confrontation with the West, 85% of respondents expressed the 
belief that Russia inspires fear abroad, and 75% saw this fear as 
a positive phenomenon.67 Individuals who are powerless and have 
been humiliated by those in power paradoxically see compensa-
tion for their own frustration in identifying with a strong govern-
ment which uses violence against the ‘other’, thus bringing about 
a rise in collective self-esteem.
The culture of violence is also boosted by standards of thinking 
and acting which had previously been known mainly from sto-
ries about the world of prisons and concentration camps which, 
because of the universality of these experiences during the 20th 
century, became etched into the cultural code of the Russians, 
and finally took shape as the criminal world penetrated political 
and social life after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In Russian 
popular culture during the 1990s, violence became something of 
a routine. In social relationships, as well as among the elite, a phe-
nomenon foreign to the Western culture of positivist legalism 
became deeply ingrained: informal rules of social conduct, in 
Russian ‘poniatiya’. These rules facilitate the practical operation 
of the Russian state, in which the arbitrariness of power creates 
a phenomenon where universal standards are substituted by in-
formal and individualised rules – a situation which is character-
istic in processes of demodernisation.68
65 http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2016/08/25/654377-vlast-silu
66 S. Stephenson, Gangs of Russia..., op. cit., p. 226.
67 A survey by the Общественное Мнение Foundation from the beginning of 
2017: http://rosbalt.ru/russia/2017/01/14/1583114.html
68 Жизнь по понятиям: «реальные пацаны» и их моральные правила: 
http://www.nlobooks.ru/node/6614
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Against the background of these experiences, the two embodi-
ments of the idea of a strong government are, on the one hand, 
the figure of the ‘good Chekist’, and on the other, the criminal. The 
roots of the fascination with the figure of the ‘secret service man’ 
should be sought in the militaristic, mobilising mentality of the 
Soviet period, built up by conspiracy theories and the myth of the 
eternal fight against the external and internal enemy, as well as 
in the longing for a strong state during the ‘times of trouble’ in the 
1990s. In turn, the reasons for the popularity of criminals as role 
models in Russia are connected with people’s ideas about justice. 
The criminal is not only a rebel who had the courage to stand up 
to the oppressive state: for many people, the informal, criminal 
system of standards replaced the law of the state during the chaos 
of the 1990s, and even imposed a semblance of order.69 Both these 
ideals are consciously exploited by Vladimir Putin in his public 
image: the former KGB man has recreated himself as a ‘hooligan’, 
even using the language of the criminal subculture in order to 
strengthen his charismatic social legitimacy.70 The model of ‘ he-
gemonic masculinity’ which hypnotises ‘the Soviet man’, centred 
in the person of the creator of Russia’s foreign policy, is a strong 
persuasive element. This image is deployed when, in the name of 
the interests of authoritarian power, there is a need to mobilise 
society around the idea of confrontation with the enemy, the need 
for the use of force in foreign policy, or a need to return to quasi-
isolationism in the name of Russia’s ‘greatness’.
As violence becomes commonplace, and the people get used 
to it, as distrust and suspicion towards the ‘other’ rise, 
a kind of ‘axiological community’ is being built between the 
69 S. Stephenson, Gangs of Russia..., op. cit., p. 225
70 For examples of Putin’s usage of criminal language: К. Харатьян, Жаргон 
Владимира Путина, www.vedomosti.ru, 25 December 2012. The begin-
ning of Putin’s popularity is associated with his famous threat, expressed 
in criminal jargon, that he would ‘shaft [Chechen terrorists] in the toi-
let’. See interview with Lev Gudkov: https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/
video/2017/07/23/725405-putinu-restavratsiya-totalitarizma
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decision-makers and Putin’s voters, as reflected in the accept-
ance of the instruments which the Kremlin uses in its foreign 
policy. This allows Moscow to use the element of surprise in its re-
lations with Western governments, which are much less inclined 
to use coercive measures, military force in place of persuasion, 
or purely verbal pressure. The belief that rule based on dialogue 
is weak makes it easier for the Russian elite to acquire a social 
mandate for its principled rejection of the paradigm of liberal 
democratic culture in its essence. This impedes the diffusion of 
Western models for organising the state or the relationship be-
tween the government and the people, as well as the adoption of 
the Western culture of international negotiations.
3. Virtual politics: the sphere of lies and manipulation
Another product of the culture of violence is the acceptance 
of manipulation and lies as a standard instrument of foreign 
policy. Two phenomena form this fertile soil: the legacy of 
Soviet ‘doublethink’ and quasi-tribal thinking, built on a fun-
damental opposition between ‘us’ and ‘the other’ as the axis of 
the world’s structure. For a substantial part of Russians, decep-
tion, like violence, is an acceptable tool of external action, because 
their interactions with their own state have been built upon it 
since time immemorial. The inferiority complex, in combination 
with the complex of lost greatness, births the desire to achieve 
satisfaction by outwitting one’s opponent. There is no fair play in 
the fight, the more so as the desire to retaliate and promote one’s 
self-esteem cannot be met by the state’s economic performance or 
the attractiveness of its ideology, and the use of military advan-
tages as a bogeyman pose too high a risk in the long run. In this 
kind of fight, all moves are permitted, and lying and manipula-
tion are raised to the rank of a military art. One testament to such 
thinking is the survey carried out by the Levada Centre at the be-
ginning of 2015. When asked about the presence of Russian troops 
in Ukraine, 37% of respondents replied that the Russian govern-
ment were telling the truth (that there were no Russian troops in 
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Ukraine), but another 38% felt that although the authorities were 
lying, ‘in the current international situation Russia is doing the 
right thing by denying’ [the troops’ presence].71
The relativism of values appropriate to the ‘Soviet man’, which 
is a kind of precursor to the postmodern concept of ‘post-truth’, 
has been deepened and cemented by the ‘political technolo-
gies’72 of the 1990s, the era of virtual politics. In the first decade 
of post-Soviet transformation, the lie – as a fundamental factor in 
a Soviet reality which was “governed by the logic of the spectacle, 
which replaced reality and became reality” – became an uncondi-
tional and generally used tool of relatively free political struggle, 
so that next – in the Putin era – it could become a tool for disman-
tling democratic freedoms and strengthening authoritarianism. 
The media became the key link between the elite and the national 
version of the ‘culture of deceit’.73
In this context, politics is understood not so much as the process 
of the interests of various social groups rubbing along together, 
and a game which is played according to rules – which get bent, 
but at least they still exist – but rather as a thoroughly virtual 
sphere, subject to any kind of manipulation and ceaseless 
recreation, free even from the limitations of logic and facts. In 
this approach, facts are merely the magma from which any kind 
of message can be moulded. Whereas in the West virtual politics is 
generally an addition to real politics, in Russia it is a substance of 
71 K. Giles, Russia’s ‘New’ Tools..., op. cit.
72 A tool for conducting politics, consisting in manipulating public opinion in 
order to raise support for a politician or discredit his opponents. The Russian 
concept of ‘political technologist’ corresponds to the English term ‘spin doc-
tor’, although the former's room for manoeuvre is generally incomparably 
greater, due to the lack of transparency in public life in Russia and the lack of 
mechanisms controlling power. Political technologies were applied in Russia 
for the first time on a large scale during the presidential election in 1996.
73 A. Wilson, Virtual Politics. Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World, New 
Haven-London 2005, pp. xvi, 8-9. As the author writes, virtual politics is how 
the elites manage, manipulate and restrain democracy.
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the authorities’ activityand takes on a much more radical form.74 
The sense of disorientation deliberately cultivated in the audience 
either creates a need for a black and white view of a world, which 
is eagerly provided by the Kremlin’s propaganda, or it arouses the 
passivity of the audience, who have lost all faith in the possibility 
of objective information.
4. The imperial syndrome of Russian society
The susceptibility of Russian society to mobilising rhetoric in 
a militaristic, confrontational spirit stems largely from the void of 
identity after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the political-
economic turmoil of the 1990s, and the absence of an attractive 
project for a modern Russia. After a period when Russian soci-
ety underwent a short-lived fascination with the West, born 
during the perestroika period by naïve expectations of integration 
on an equal footing and catching up with the Western states in 
their level of development, the painful response of the ‘impe-
rial mentality’ to the USA’s superpower politics arose. Since 
then, it has primarily been the US upon which the criticism and 
negative emotions of the Russian people have been focused. The 
individual frustrations and individual feelings of innate defec-
tiveness are added to the sense of the defectiveness of the state, 
the collapse of its prestige on the international stage.
Russian society decided to take refuge in the safe and famil-
iar model, affirmed by the state, of Soviet-style great power, 
underpinned by a historical policy based on the militaristic na-
tional mythology, which legitimises strong government. The 
Soviet wartime mythology was underpinned by the militaristic 
traditions of imperial Russia. Its central element is the category of 
war, the ‘enemy syndrome’ typical of the authoritarian personality, 
and, above all, the sacralisation of the victory in the Great Patriotic 
War (1941-5). This has become basically the only positive point of 
74 Ibid., pp. 47–8.
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reference for structuring the Russians’ collective identity, the high-
est manifestation of their superpower status and the effectiveness 
of their international policy, and as such is not subject to revision. 
The war has never been rationalised and has not been analysed 
from the point of view of the individual – only and always from the 
perspective of the superpower might and interests of the state.75
While the victory of 1945 gave Russian identity a strong messianic 
element, the Cold War which occurred shortly after it led to a cou-
pling in the collective mentality of these messianic elements 
with anti-Occidentalism. When the former ally became the en-
emy, the subject of existential threats to the nation’s existence, 
its martyrology, the ‘besieged fortress’ syndrome, thus became 
permanently associated with the need to resist the West, as an ab-
solute condition for the power and the security of the state and the 
nation: anti-fascism became opposed to Western capitalism and 
liberalism.76 Of considerable importance is the current cynical 
playing on emotions through the use by Kremlin propaganda of 
the term ‘Nazism’, associated with the mass deaths of the war, in 
order to discredit the West (and in recent years, Ukraine first and 
foremost). This means shifting the psychological barriers towards 
the acceptance of radical methods in foreign policy.
Paradoxically, the effectiveness of anti-Western propaganda is also 
linked to the fact that in the public reception the imagined West 
is assigned those features, motives, beliefs, which according 
to the Russian people are proper to the Russian government. 
Transferring negative values onto the ‘Other’ helps the citizens of 
an aggressive state to free themselves from their own imperfec-
tions.77 The greater the pride in Russia, the more the perceptions, 
75 For details see Л. Гудков, Негативная идентичность. Статьи 1997-2002, 
Moscow 2004, p. 33.
76 Ibid., p. 37.
77 Idem, Механизмы кризисной консолидации, Контрапункт 5, Septem-
ber 2016.
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uncomfortable and offensive to the collective consciousness, of 
Russia or the Soviet Union as a backward and poor country are 
crowded out. This helps compensate for the cutting frustration re-
sulting from low standards of living, the amorphous value system, 
the lack of any sense of meaning, and the constraints on individual 
development due to the nature of the institutional system.78
A marked increase in negative attitudes to the West has been 
observed since the mid-1990s, culminating in 1999 (mainly in 
connection with NATO’s enlargement eastwards, and the bomb-
ings of Yugoslavia by NATO forces).79 The importance of domestic 
political conditions to Russian attitudes is demonstrated by the 
fact that the reanimation of the great-power and confrontational 
attitudes was an echo of the internal Russian symptoms of crisis 
at that time;80 anti-Occidentalism and anti-Americanism became 
powerful instruments of political struggle.81 Whereas in 1996 only 
6% of Russians were ready to call the US an enemy, in 1999 Amer-
ica found itself top of the polls of the enemies of Russia (in 2008, 
35% called the US an enemy).82 In May 2017, 61% of Russians said 
their attitude towards the US was bad or very bad.83
In the Russian people, then, a lasting prejudice against the 
West has arisen, but one which had hardened even before 
Putin’s rise to power.84 Whereas in the 1990s the rise of anti-
Western sentiments was rather natural, a genuinely bottom-up 
78 Idem, Негативная..., op. cit., pp. 156-7.
79 Почему мы не любим..., op. cit.
80 Л. Гудков, Негативная..., op. cit., p. 673
81 Ibid., p. 674.
82 In May 1998, 75% of Russians believed that the US was seeking to weaken 
Russia and transform it into a warehouse of raw materials. Почему мы не 
любим..., op. cit.
83 Survey by the Levada Centre in May 2017. The zenith of Russia's negative 
views (a ‘bad’ attitude towards the USA) was reached in January 2015, with 
a figure of 81%. www.levada.ru
84 Почему мы не любим..., op. cit.
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phenomenon, over the next decade the Russian authorities began 
to deliberately stoke it and use it to justify their superpower am-
bitions as a response forced upon them by the ‘aggressive actions’ 
of the US and NATO.85 These negative trends were enhanced in 
2003-5 (the second wave of NATO enlargement eastwards, the 
wave of ‘colour revolutions’); then the sense of belonging to West-
ern culture, which had been important for collective identity in 
the 1990s, began to wane; thereafter, the belief arose that Russia 
is a separate civilisation with its own normative system. Thanks 
to this, public support for suspending or violating the formally 
recognised norms of international law has been built up, and 
the sanctions for violating them are not seen as a justified pun-
ishment, but rather as testimony to the growing power of Russia 
and to other countries’ unfair competition with her.86 This has 
therefore led to a convergence between the public’s images of 
Russia on the international stage and the understanding of 
international politics in Putin’s inner circle.
In connection with the annexation of Crimea, which is seen as the 
highest manifestation of the Russia’s might as a superpower, the 
self-esteem of the Russian people increased remarkably, as did the 
belief that Russia has started to be more respected in the world87. 
In 2014, this success in foreign policy (the ‘recovery’ of Crimea) al-
most doubled public support for the Russian political system com-
pared to 2013.88 At that time 70% of Russians said that Russia was 
becoming a great power again (compared to 47% in 2011); admira-
tion for Putin, who is seen to have demonstrated the greatness of 
Russia in action, also rose.89
85 Ibid.
86 Л. Гудков, Механизмы..., op. cit. Д. Волков, Настроения..., op. cit.
87 Л. Гудков, Механизмы..., op. cit.
88 The average score rose from 3.3 points to 6.0, on a scale from 1 to 10. NEORUSS 
survey from 2013-2014: M. Alexseev, H. Hale, A New Wave of Russian Na-
tionalism? What Really Changed in Public Opinion After Crimea, PONARS 
Eurasia Policy Memo no. 362.
89 Почему мы не любим..., op. cit.
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The bottom-up demand for an enemy or opponent as an external 
centre around which to crystallise identity therefore correlates to 
the top-down need to build a society in a state of mobilisation. In 
such a society, the image of an enemy is a prerequisite for main-
taining the ‘state of emergency’90 in which the traditional criteria 
for evaluating the effectiveness of the authorities are suspended.
90 Л. Гудков, Негативная..., op. cit., p. 45.
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conclusIon
The Kremlin’s confrontational stance towards the West is not 
a temporary matter; it does not derive from the current histori-
cal moment, from specific differences of interests which could 
be defined and overcome through dialogue. Rather, it is a per-
manent strategic theme of Russian foreign policy. The year 
2014 as a caesura in mutual relations was not so much a qualita-
tive breakthrough as the culmination of a trend which had been 
growing for a long time.
The confrontation with the West on a variety of levels – politi-
cal, economic, social, propaganda – derives from the inherent 
characteristics of the Russian authoritarian regime (both in 
terms of ‘classical’ authoritarianism and in its specifically Russian 
instance), and from the mentality of the ruling elite included 
within it. The latter, in turn, is largely a product of a particular 
type of society and of the specific path of the state’s historical 
development, which is likely to remain unchanged in the fore-
seeable future. In the Russian paradigm, shaped by a system of 
rules which has governed political struggles for centuries, there 
is no room for a ‘positive-sum’ game, because in the Russian view-
point conflict is inevitable; victory is only possible by taking the 
initiative, dictating the ‘agenda’, and imposing upon the confron-
tation a dynamic which accords with its self-interest.
Foreign policy in its Russian version is treated as an element 
of domestic policy to a much greater degree than in the case 
of other states. It is subjugated to the domestic political objec-
tives of the elite, the most important of which is the permanent 
reproduction of the Chekist-kleptokratic model of feudal-
ism. In this model, the state is actually owned by a small group 
of decision-makers; the values enshrined in the constitution (in-
cluding property rights) are merely a matter of convention, and 
the members of the elite harbour a paranoid fear of losing politi-
cal influence, as in the face of the degradation of the institutional 
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system and the fiction of law, this influence is the only guarantee 
of the preservation of their property, and the liberty and secu-
rity of their persons. Frequently, therefore the reasons for their 
behaviour, which is often incomprehensible to Western po-
litical culture, should be sought outside official policy: in the 
‘grey area’, where the spheres of the legal and illegal, the spheres 
of acquired habits, cold calculation and subconscious, existential 
fears, phobias and complexes all intermingle.
In this approach, the ‘traditional’ criteria for evaluating the 
effectiveness of foreign policy, such as credibility in the inter-
national arena, constructive contributions to the development of 
international integration, foreign economic turnover, and the at-
tractiveness of the ‘soft power’ of the state, all fall by the wayside. 
Russia’s attitude to international law increasingly reflects the arbi-
trary attitude of the elite towards the law of the state, and is subor-
dinate to the Kremlin’s desire to retain as much room for manoeu-
vre as possible in both domestic and foreign politics. In the face of 
the fact that Russia has little to offer its international environ-
ment, while at the same time it is struggling to return to the 
position of a superpower (of which the only sign it currently has 
is its nuclear arsenal and, to a lesser extent, its permanent place on 
the UN Security Council), its foreign policy is being implement-
ed by means of force, manipulation, coercion and blackmail. All 
this determines the shape of Putin’s specific neo-Sovietism, which 
– adapted to the conditions of globalisation – carries within itself 
the old Soviet mental matrices.
Such policies have a favourable context in the social attitudes 
of the Russian people, which are still largely governed by 
a set of characteristics typical of the authoritarian personal-
ity. The government’s anti-Occidentalism does not therefore car-
ry any domestic political risk with it. While the Russian authori-
ties’ domestic policies are often assessed negatively by the general 
public (mainly in the light of the country’s socio-economic prob-
lems), the sphere of foreign policy, which is virtually impossible 
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to verify in the everyday experience of the Russian people, is the 
bearer of particular significance – the national honour, the dig-
nity and power of the state, the defence of his authority and secu-
rity. “It is precisely this sphere which unites the atomised Russian 
society in a collective whole, to compensate for the deficits and in-
feriority complex of the citizens’ private life.”91
However, because the relationship between the government and 
the people in Russia is based not so much on voluntary subordi-
nation as on compulsion, the morbid fear of a ‘colour revolution’ 
(especially when faced with the threat of long-term stagnation) 
prompts the Kremlin to deepen its isolation from society and 
combat any manifestations of independence. In this situation, 
only confrontation and the designation of an ‘enemy’ can le-
gitimise the poor state of the economy, the deterioration of 
standards of living for the general public, and the lack of any 
prospects for development, as well as the regime’s throttling 
of any opportunities for innovative development, which would 
be politically risky. The only alternative to this anti-Western ‘con-
servatism’, which mobilises the people around the government, 
would probably be xenophobic nationalism, which in a multieth-
nic state, hosting masses of immigrants from the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, would seriously jeopardise Russia’s domestic politi-
cal stability.
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91 Л. Гудков, Механизмы..., op. cit.
